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DEPARTURE BAR UNDER MENDIOLA V. HOLDER AND 
WILLIAM V. GONZALES 
Daniel E. Bonilla
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 29, 2009, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) of-
ficials removed
1
 then-green-card holder Vakhtang Pruidze based on a 
state conviction for possession of a controlled substance.
2
  Thirteen 
days later, the state court set aside the conviction, and Pruidze moved 
to reopen
3
 his removal proceedings.
4
  The Board of Immigration Ap-
peals (BIA or “Board”), however, denied the motion because Pruidze 
no longer physically resided in the United States, and thus the BIA 
held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion.
5
  Ultimately, how-
ever, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2005, 
University of Louisville.  I would like to thank Professor Lori Nessel for her guidance 
throughout the development of this Comment, Megan Bedell for her invaluable sug-
gestions and assistance, and the Law Review members who helped prepare this 
Comment for publication. 
 1 Until the passing of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996, the term “deportation” referred to aliens who had been 
removed from the country.  Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-587–89 
(1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C. (2006)); see Jennifer M. 
Chacon, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 140 n.28 
(2009).  IIRIRA consolidated the then-separate “exclusion” and “deportation” pro-
ceedings under one all-encompassing label of “removal” proceedings.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1324c(e) (2006); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1546(a), 1015(e)–(f) (2006). 
 2 Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 234, 235 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 3 “A motion to reopen is based on ‘facts or evidence not available at the time of 
the original decision’ [and] must be supported by affidavits or other evidence.”  
RACHEL E. ROSENBLOOM ET AL., CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND INT’L JUSTICE AT BOSTON 
COLL., POST-DEPARTURE MOTIONS TO REOPEN OR RECONSIDER 2 (2010)(quoting Patel v. 
Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 610, 612 (7th Cir. 2004)), available at 
http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/humanrights/pdf/MTRPracticeAdv
isory2010FINAL_APPENDIX.pdf ; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B) (2006). 
 4 Pruidze, 632 F.3d at 235.  
 5 Id. 
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BIA cannot constrict its statutory jurisdiction based on the Attorney 
General’s regulations or its own decisions.
6
 
On May 7, 2004, the BIA, within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, 
granted Rafael Martinez Coyt thirty days to depart the United States 
voluntarily.
7
  By fault of his former attorney, however, Coyt did not 
learn of the court’s ruling until October 2004.
8
  After being removed, 
Coyt filed a motion for the BIA to reissue the decision in order to 
grant a new voluntary departure period.
9
  The BIA denied the motion 
on grounds that Coyt’s motion had been withdrawn once he de-
parted the country.
10
  After reviewing the regulation at issue, the 
Ninth Circuit held that a motion is not withdrawn when the alien has 
been involuntarily removed.
11
 
On April 9, 2009, DHS officials removed Jesus Contreras-
Bocanegra after the BIA denied his motion to cancel his removal.
12
  
Thereafter, Contreras filed a timely motion to reopen based on inef-
fective assistance of counsel.
13
  Once again, the BIA denied Contre-
ras’s motion; this time, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction due 
to his departure.
14
  The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that based on 
its prior rulings, the regulation at issue divests the BIA of jurisdiction 
to entertain such motions, even when they are timely.
15
 
The above-referenced cases are only three examples of how dif-
ferent circuit courts of appeals interpret post-departure bars under 
the Code of Federal Regulations.  For example, immigrants who have 
been subjected to removal proceedings in New Jersey, New York, 
Ohio, Indiana, or Maryland, but are currently residing in another 
country, are permitted to file motions to reopen regardless of wheth-
er they are currently the subject of removal proceedings or whether 
the U.S. government has already removed them.
16
  Even immigrants 
 
 6 Id. at 237–38. 
 7 Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 903–04 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 8 Id. at 904. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 907. 
 12 Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1170, 1170–71 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 13 Id. at 1171. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 1172. 
 16 The Third Circuit, which includes New Jersey, held that the regulatory post-
departure bar conflicts with Congress’s clear intent regarding motions to reopen.  
Espinal v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213, 224 (3d Cir. 2011).  The Second Circuit, of 
which New York is a part, has held that the BIA cannot constrict its own jurisdiction.  
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who have been subjected to removal proceedings in Alaska but are 
currently living in another country, so long as their removal was invo-
luntarily and/or they are not currently subject to removal proceed-
ings, may file a motion to reopen.
17
  Unfortunately, the regulatory 
departure bar under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) prohibits immigrants who 
have been subjected to removal proceedings in Maine, Texas, Colo-
rado, or Florida, among other states, from moving to reopen their 
proceedings once they have departed the country.
18
  This Comment 
sets forth that such inconsistent interpretations of federal law and 
regulations threaten to undermine the important concepts of un-
iformity and just application of the law in American jurisprudence. 
The lack of uniformity in application of the departure bar is of 
increasing concern due to the growing annual number of removed 
aliens in recent years.
19
  In fiscal year 2010, 392,862 aliens were re-
moved,
20
 more than double the number of removals in 1999.
21
  The 
 
Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 100 (2d Cir. 2011).  The court in Luna, however, li-
mited its holding to statutory motions.  Id. at 102.  Ohio is located within the Sixth 
Circuit’s jurisdiction and permits aliens to file motions to reopen their proceedings 
after they have departed because the court has ruled that the BIA cannot constrict its 
statutory jurisdiction by regulations or its own decisions.  Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 
234, 235, 237–38 (6th Cir. 2011).  Indiana, which is within the Seventh Circuit’s ju-
risdiction, permits aliens to file motions to reopen or reconsider for the same rea-
sons articulated by the Sixth Circuit.  Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 595 
(7th Cir. 2010).  Maryland, which is within the Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction, permits 
aliens to file motions to reopen pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) regardless of 
whether they are physically present in the United States.  William v. Gonzales, 499 
F.3d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 17 Alaska, which falls within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, permits an alien to 
reopen a case pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) if the alien moves to reopen after 
the removal order is final or after being involuntarily removed.  Coyt v. Holder, 593 
F.3d 902, 905–07 (9th Cir. 2010); Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 18 Each state falls under the jurisdictions of the First, Fifth, Tenth, or Eleventh 
Circuits, respectively.  See Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1170, 1173 (10th 
Cir. 2010); Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303, 1311 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 502 (2010); Ovalles v. Holder, 577 F.3d 288, 295–96 (5th Cir. 2009) (relying on 
Navarro-Miranda v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2003)); Sankar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
284 F. App’x 798, 799 (11th Cir. 2008); Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438, 441–
42 (1st Cir. 2007); Ablahad v. Gonzales, 217 F. App’x 470, 475 n.6 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 19 See generally Christina LaBrie, Lack of Uniformity in the Deportation of Criminal 
Aliens, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357 (1999) (describing different aspects of 
the interplay between federal immigration law and state criminal law).   
 20 Stephen Dinan, More Criminal Aliens Deported Last Year, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 6, 
2010, at A1; see also Anthony M. DeStefano, Deportations Rise Under Obama, NEWSDAY, 
Aug. 2, 2010, at A32. 
 21 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008 YEARBOOK OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 95 (2009)(noting that there were 183,114 deportations in 
1999), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/ 
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continuous increase in the number of immigrants removed each year 
emphasizes the significant implications stemming from the fact that 
immigrants unfortunate enough to have resided in particular states in 
the United States will be forever barred from reopening their cases, 
despite valid grounds for doing so. 
The situation is further compounded by the fact that most crim-
inal convictions result in mandatory detention.
22
  Such a practice, in 
conjunction with the rising number of deportations, raises new con-
cerns.  For example, in Mendiola v. Holder, DHS officials transferred 
the petitioner, Mendiola, to an immigration detention facility in 
another circuit court’s jurisdiction.
23
  The immigration judge (IJ) de-
nied Mendiola’s motion for a change of venue,
24
 and, ultimately, the 
court denied his motion to reopen due to the regulatory post-
departure bar, which deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear the 
motion.
25
  This practice implicates serious concerns for aliens facing 
removal proceedings in this country because DHS officials, or Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents, can transfer an alien 
to a jurisdiction that is more favorable to their position;
26
 as a practic-
al matter, DHS officials can engage in forum shopping.
27
 
In order to ensure that litigants are afforded adequate legal pro-
tections, the Legislature has created several safeguards in the judicial 
system.  For instance, the United States Supreme Court recently 
 
2008/ois_yb_2008.pdf.  See generally Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls: How Restric-
tions on Judicial Review and the Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Fed-
eral Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37 (2007) (discussing how litigation has increased 
in light of Congress’s narrowing and elimination of prior forms of relief). 
 22 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 389 (2002) (“Furthermore, Congress has 
ordered the mandatory detention of most non-citizens whose criminal convictions 
render them deportable.”). 
 23 Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303, 1305 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 502 (2010); Mendiola v. Gonzales, 189 F. App’x 810, 812 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 24 Mendiola, 189 F. App’x at 812. 
 25 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1311.  
 26 Id. 
 27 See RICHARD L. SKINNER, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES RELATED TO DETAINEE TRANSFERS 1 
(2009)(“ICE transfers detainees to other detention facilities to prepare for final re-
moval, reduce overcrowding, or meet the specialized needs of the detainee.”), availa-
ble at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?bc=1016%7C6715%7C 
16871%7C31048%7C30690 .  An alien’s counsel may also engage in forum shopping, 
as noted by Judge Bea of the Ninth Circuit.  Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing 
on H.R. 109-537 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 8 (2006) (statement of 
the Honorable Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judge, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals). 
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noted in Kucana v. Holder that “[t]he motion to reopen is an ‘impor-
tant safeguard’ intended ‘to ensure a proper and lawful disposition’ 
of immigration proceedings.”
28
  Courts should not subject such an 
important legal right to chance—a chance that a deportable alien 
lives in a jurisdiction that permits him or her to file a motion to reo-
pen after departing the country.  Because “this conflict involves an is-
sue of significant practical importance,”
29
 it is imperative that the 
immigration courts provide uniformity in the application of the regu-
latory departure bar throughout the country. 
It is also clear that Congress’s intent in enacting the Illegal Im-
migration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA) and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA)
30
 
was to make motions to reopen available to immigrants inside and 
outside of the country.
31
  This Comment proposes that Congress 
should modify the INA to include language clearly indicating that an 
alien’s geographic location at the time of filing of a motion to reopen 
or reconsider removal proceedings should not bar the immigration 
courts of jurisdiction to hear such motions.  Ultimately, this Com-
ment concludes that amending the INA’s statutory language to expli-
citly grant immigration courts the jurisdiction to consider an alien’s 
motion to reopen regardless of whether the alien is within or without 
the country would provide uniformity in this context by resolving the 
current circuit conflicts while also remaining true to the IIRIRA’s sta-
tutory purpose.  Part II of this Comment begins with background in-
formation on the history of immigration law in the United States by 
discussing the INA before the IIRIRA’s enactment in 1996.  Part III 
focuses on the state of immigration law after the IIRIRA’s enactment.  
In Part IV, this Comment provides a brief overview of three BIA cases, 
each of which address different departure bar issues.  This Part pro-
vides insight into some of the background matters that are analyzed 
in the circuit cases discussed throughout this Comment.  Part V ana-
lyzes the Fourth Circuit’s William v. Gonzales and the Ninth Circuit’s 
 
 28 130 S. Ct. 827, 834 (2010) (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 18 (2008)). 
 29 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 20, Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303 (10th 
Cir. 2009) (No. 08-9565), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/07/09-1378_pet.pdf.   
 30 Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified in scattered sections 
of 8 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 31 See Reyes-Torres v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (“‘The intent 
of Congress is clear’ in that ‘Congress anticipated that petitioners would be able to 
pursue relief after departing from the United States.’” (quoting Coyt v. Holder, 593 
F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 2010))). 
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recent decision in Mendiola v. Holder.  In addition, this Part illustrates 
the lack of uniformity in U.S. circuit courts of appeals by noting the 
differences in departure bar jurisprudence found in several different 
cases.  Then, Part VI provides an argument for modification or ab-
olishment of the regulatory departure bars.  Lastly, Part VII discusses 
possible solutions to the lack of uniformity by proposing an amend-
ment to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) that would render all currently 
phrased regulatory departure bars invalid and thus inapplicable to 
departed aliens who file motions to reopen their proceedings. 
II. THE HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION LAW BEFORE IIRIRA 
This Comment provides the historical background behind the 
origins of the regulatory departure bars to better illustrate their cur-
rent varying interpretations.  Congress enacted the first general im-
migration statute in 1882, which “imposed a head tax of 50 cents [per 
immigrant] and excluded idiots, lunatics, convicts, and persons likely 
to become a public charge.”
32
  Also in 1882, Congress passed the con-
troversial Chinese Exclusion Act.
33
  A codification of the general im-
migration law occurred in 1891,
34
 and by 1893, Congress enacted a 
provision for the establishment of boards to determine the admissibil-
ity of arriving immigrants.
35
  By 1903, the legislature revised the statu-
tory provisions to enumerate rejections of certain types of immi-
grants.
36
  In 1907, Congress added additional exclusions for the 
feebleminded and persons who had committed crimes involving 
moral turpitude, among others.
37
  Essentially, Congress aimed to dis-
 
 32 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.02[2] (2010); 
see Act of Aug. 3, 1882, 22 Stat. 214. 
 33 Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, repealed by the Magnuson Act, ch. 
344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600 (1943) (prohibiting the immigration of Chinese Laborers in the 
United States); see Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and 
the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 29 (1998) (“The Chinese Ex-
clusion Act of 1882 was the first Asian Exclusion Law, and the one that generated the 
most contemporary controversy.”). 
 34 While Congress and different states had already enacted legislation relating to 
immigration prior to 1891, see Sheila Jackson Lee, Why Immigration Reform Requires a 
Comprehensive Approach that Includes Both Legalization Programs and Provisions to Secure 
the Border, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 267, 268–69 (2006), the codification in 1891 “pro-
vided the first general immigration law applying to all aliens entering the United 
States,” Marian L. Smith, The INS and the Singular Status of North American Indians, 21 
AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RESEARCH J. 131, 146 (1997). 
 35 See GORDON ET AL., supra note 32. 
 36 See Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213 (repealed 1907) (excluding 
epileptics, insane persons, professional beggars, and anarchists, among others). 
 37 See Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 2, 34 Stat. 898. 
BONILLA_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2012  6:17 PM 
2012] COMMENT 281 
 
allow certain types of individuals whom Congress deemed to be of 
unsound mind or character from entering the United States. 
Also in 1907, Congress created the Dillingham Commission to 
investigate the immigration system of the United States.
38
  Although 
the commission’s report included recommendations to improve the 
country’s immigration system, Congress did not adopt any such legis-
lation until 1917, when it passed a comprehensive revision of the 
immigration laws over the veto of President Wilson.
39
  This compre-
hensive revision expanded the powers of immigration officers and 
conferred discretionary authority to admit certain barred groups.
40
  
After World War I ended in 1918, immigration began to rise in the 
United States, with some years registering over a million immigrants 
per year.
41
  This influx of immigrants ultimately resulted in the Quota 
Law of 1921.
42
 
The Acts of 1917 and 1921 were the primary components of 
immigration policy until the Alien Registration Act of 1940, which 
expanded the Attorney General’s power.
43
  This Act delegated to the 
Attorney General “broad authority to establish rules and regulations 
to enforce the nation’s immigration laws.”
44
  Pursuant to regulations, 
the Attorney General established the BIA in 1940; the regulations 
“authorized the Board to ‘issue orders of deportation’; ‘consider and 
determine appeals’; and resolve motions for ‘reconsideration, rear-
gument or reopening of a case after the issuance of a final deci-
sion.’”
45
  Then, in 1952, Congress enacted the INA, also known as the 
 
 38 See GORDON ET AL., supra note 32, § 2.02[2]. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Act of May 19, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, 42 Stat. 5 (placing numerical limitations 
on how many immigrants of certain nationalities could be permitted in the United 
States), repealed by Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, 279 (1952). 
 43 Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. (2006)), amended by Internal Security Act 
of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987. 
 44 Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 661 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 45 Id. at 654–55; see Regulations Governing Departmental Organization and Au-
thority, 5 Fed. Reg. 3502, 3503 (Sept. 4, 1940).  In 1913, the immigration-related fed-
eral agency established in 1891  
was transferred to the newly created Department of Labor and divided 
into the Bureau of Immigration and the Bureau of Naturalization.  The 
two bureaus were combined in 1933 . . . and . . . named the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS) . . . .  [In] March 2003, the func-
tions of the INS were transferred to DHS.   
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McCarran-Walter Act.
46
  The INA further expanded the Attorney 
General’s authority by granting the Attorney General the power to 
administer and enforce the Act.
47
  It also “authorized him to ‘establish 
such regulations . . . as he deem[ed] necessary for carrying out [that] 
authority.’”
48
  Subsequently, the “Attorney General promulgated a se-
ries of regulations defining the ‘[a]ppellate jurisdiction’ of the BIA 
and the ‘[p]owers of the Board.’”
49
  Regulations promulgated at this 
time included motions to reopen and motions for reconsideration of 
Board decisions.
50
  More importantly, these regulations also included 
the first version of the regulatory departure bar, which stated that 
“[a] motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made 
by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of deportation pro-
ceedings subsequent to his departure from the United States.”
51
 
In the 1954 case In re G-y-B, the BIA upheld the departure bar as 
a jurisdictional limitation of its power to consider a motion to reo-
pen.
52
  The Board’s holding clearly validated the regulatory departure 
bar.  Then, in 1958, the Attorney General revised the regulations to 
include sua sponte authority for the BIA to reopen proceedings and 
reconsider its own decisions.
53
  Congress also made changes by 
amending the INA in 1961 to include provisions relating to judicial 
 
Zhang, 617 F.3d at 655 n.3 (internal citations omitted).  The provisions established 
under the Alien Registration Act were further enlarged by the Internal Security Act 
of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (codified as amended in scattered 
section of 50 U.S.C.). 
 46 Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified in scattered sections 
of 8 U.S.C.).  The Act was co-named after its sponsors Senator Pat McCarran and 
Congressman Francis Walter.  Richard Boswell, Immigration Law: Crafting True Immi-
gration Reform, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 7, 8–9 (2008).   
 47 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 655.  
 48 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2006); Zhang, 617 F.3d at 655 (quoting § 103(a), 66 Stat. at 
173). 
 49 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 655 (quoting Immigration and Nationality Regulations, 17 
Fed. Reg. 11,469, 11,475 (Dec. 19, 1952) (final rule codified at 8 C.F.R. § 6.1(b), (d) 
(1952)). 
 50 8 C.F.R. § 6.2 (1952); see Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656 n.4. 
 51 § 6.2; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2011) (containing an identical current limit 
on motions to reopen and reconsider exclusion, deportation, or removal proceed-
ings before the BIA); id. § 1003.23(b)(1)(containing an identical current limit on 
motions to reopen and reconsider exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings 
before an IJ); Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656. 
 52 6 I. & N. Dec. 159, 160 (B.I.A. 1954). 
 53 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656. 
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review of BIA decisions.
54
  One such provision modeled the regulatory 
departure bar and stated that “[a]n order of deportation or of exclu-
sion shall not be reviewed by any court if the alien . . . has departed 
from the United States after the issuance of the order.”
55
  Congress’s 
amendment codified the departure bar.
56
 
The Attorney General’s regulations pertaining to motions to 
reopen remained unchanged until the Immigration Act of 1990.
57
  
This Act authorized the Attorney General to 
issue regulations with respect to . . . the period of time in which 
motions to reopen . . . may be offered in deportation proceed-
ings, which regulations [should] include a limitation on the 
number of such motions that may be filed and a maximum time 
period for the filing of such motions.
58
 
Ultimately, the Attorney General followed this directive and promul-
gated regulations that permitted aliens to file only “one motion to 
reopen within 90 days.”
59
  The revised regulations, however, retained 
the IJ and the BIA’s sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings.
60
 
III. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION LAW AFTER THE IIRIRA 
In 1996, Congress enacted the IIRIRA, which codified “some—
but not all—of the Attorney General’s 1996 regulations regarding 
motions to reopen.”
61
  Included within the statute were the Attorney 
General’s regulatory numerical and temporal limitations for motions 
to reopen or reconsider.
62
  Congress, however, did not include the 
departure bar or regulations that granted sua sponte authority to the 
IJ and BIA in the statute.
63
  Instead, the IIRIRA repealed the original-
ly codified departure bar in such a manner that an alien’s departure 
 
 54 Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650 (repealed 1996); see 
Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656. 
 55 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1964) (repealed 1996); see Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656. 
 56 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656; see § 1105a(c). 
 57 Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 545(d)(1), 104 Stat. 4978 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1252b 
(repealed 1996)); see Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656. 
 58 § 545(d)(1), 104 Stat. at 5066; see also Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656. 
 59 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657 (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 13 (2008)). 
 60 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.2(a), 3.23(b)(1) (2000); see also Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657. 
 61 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657. 
 62 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2006) (stating that “[a]n alien may file one motion 
to reopen proceedings under this section,” which must generally be filed “within 90 
days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal”).  For the text of 
the current departure bar see infra Part VII. 
 63 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657. 
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from the United States no longer foreclosed that alien’s legal ability 
to seek judicial review of a BIA order.
64
 
The Attorney General specifically addressed the IIRIRA’s repeal 
of the INA’s codified departure bar by promulgating new regulations 
on March 6, 1997, which included both a departure bar and sua 
sponte authority for the BIA to consider motions to reopen.
65
  Ac-
cording to the Attorney General, “‘[n]o provision of the [IIRIRA] 
supports reversing the long established rule that a motion to reo-
pen . . . cannot be made in immigration proceedings by or on behalf 
of a person after that person’s departure from the United States.’”
66
  
These regulations, promulgated by the Attorney General, are still in 
effect today.  Congress, however, has not amended the statutory lan-
guage in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A) or 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) to 
include these regulations or any jurisdictional bar to considering mo-
tions to reopen or reconsider by aliens after they have departed from 
the county. 
IV. BIA’S REGULATORY DEPARTURE BAR JURISPRUDENCE 
In order to understand the reasoning behind the BIA’s depar-
ture bar holdings in subsequent circuit court of appeals opinions, this 
Part will briefly highlight three major BIA cases analyzing post-
departure bars. 
A. In re G-y-B 
In 1954, the Board in In re G-y-B upheld the first version of the 
1952 regulatory post-departure bar.
67
  The IJ originally excluded the 
petitioner under the INA on grounds that he was affiliated with the 
Communist party of a foreign state.
68
  Thus, on August 14, 1953, peti-
tioner departed the country and subsequently filed a motion to reo-
pen and reconsider on November 24, 1953.
69
  Although the petitioner 
included new facts to support his claim that he should not have been 
excluded, the Board ruled that it was “without jurisdiction to act on 
 
 64 Id. 
 65 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (2011) (originally codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(a), (d) 
(1997)); see also id. §§ 1003.2(d), 1003.23(b)(1); Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657. 
 66 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657 (quoting 62 Fed. Reg. at 10,312). 
 67 6 I. & N. Dec. 159, 160 (B.I.A. 1954); see also Zhang, 617 F.3d at 656. 
 68 In re G-y-B, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 159. 
 69 Id. 
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the motion.”
70
  The Board applied the post-departure bar under 8 
C.F.R. § 6.12,
71
 which in pertinent part stated, 
Departure from the United States of a person who is the subject 
of deportation proceedings subsequent to the taking of an appeal 
but prior to a decision thereon shall constitute a withdrawal of the 
appeal and the initial decision in the case shall be final to the 
same extent as though no appeal had been taken.
72
 
For this reason, the Board dismissed petitioner’s motions.
73
 
B. In re Armendarez-Mendez 
The Board continued upholding its ruling in In re G-y-B 
throughout the years.  In 2008, the BIA once again upheld its 
longstanding application of the regulatory departure bar in In re Ar-
mendarez-Mendez.
74
  Government officials removed respondent from 
the United States on December 11, 2000.
75
  Then, nearly five and one-
half years later, respondent filed a motion for the court to reopen his 
proceedings sua sponte.
76
  Having found the departure bar in 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(d) applicable, the Board denied his motion.
77
  Respondent 
subsequently filed a petition of review to the Fifth Circuit.
78
  In light 
of the holding in the Ninth Circuit’s case Lin v. Gonzales,
79
 the Fifth 
Circuit remanded respondent’s matter to the BIA to consider the 
questions raised in his case.
80
 
On remand, in a lengthy opinion, the Board detailed the history 
and analyzed the different interpretations of the regulatory departure 
bar and the validity of the regulation as applied in different federal 
circuit courts.
81
  The Board first reviewed the Ninth Circuit’s holding 
in Lin and concluded that its reasoning was unpersuasive because 
“[w]hen the departure bar rule is examined in context, we believe it 
 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 159–60. 
 72 8 C.F.R. § 6.12 (1952). 
 73 In re G-y-B, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 160. 
 74 24 I. & N. Dec. 646, 660 (B.I.A. 2008). 
 75 Id. at 646, 647. 
 76 See id. at 646. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 473 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that so long as 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.23(b)(1) is explicitly phrased in the present tense, an IJ has jurisdiction to con-
sider a motion to reopen filed by a removed alien).  
 80 In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 646. 
 81 Id. at 647–60.    
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clearly applies to removed aliens.”
82
  The Board then detailed its disa-
greement with the Fourth Circuit’s holding in William v. Gonzales.
83
  
In the Board’s view, the Act, when taken as a whole, draws a distinc-
tion between aliens who have departed after being ordered removed 
and those who have remained in the United States.
84
  Ultimately, the 
Board explained that it was bound by the Fourth Circuit’s precedent 
to apply the William holding to BIA cases involving post-departure bar 
issues; however, the Board explicitly noted that such rulings would be 
limited exclusively to the Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction.
85
  The Board 
further explained, albeit in dicta,
86
 that “the departure bar regulation 
deprives the BIA of jurisdiction to consider statutory motions to reo-
pen after the movant’s departure from the United States.”
87
  The BIA 
concluded that, in other jurisdictions, it will continue to uphold the 
validity of the regulatory departure bars.
88
 
C. In re Bulnes-Nolasco 
In 2009, the BIA restricted the scope of the departure-bar rule in 
In re Bulnes-Nolasco with regard to a motion to reopen to rescind an 
order.
89
  The court held the departure bar inapplicable to aliens who 
have departed the country while under an outstanding order of de-
portation or removal issued in absentia.
90
  Respondent, a native and 
 
 82 Id. at 651. 
 83 Id. at 654–60; William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 330 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that the INA’s statutory language always invalidates regulatory departure bars). For a 
discussion of William see, infra Part V.A. 
 84 In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 655 (“[The William court] observed 
that [8 U.S.C. §] 240(c)(7) of the Act does not expressly distinguish between aliens 
who have departed the United States after being ordered removed and those who 
have remained.”).  The Board also disagreed with the majority in William because it 
did not find that the physical presence requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 
240(c)(7)(C)(v)(IV) implicitly invalidated the departure bar.  Id. at 658; see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(v)(IV) (2006) (imposing a physical presence requirement in the 
United States for domestic violence victims for filing motions to reopen or reconsid-
er). 
 85 In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 660. 
 86 Petitioner Armendarez-Mendez violated the regulatory filing deadline by sub-
mitting the motion at issue nearly fifteen months late.  Id. at 647.  Therefore, reach-
ing the issue of whether the departure bar was valid was not necessary to the court’s 
conclusion.  See id.  
 87 Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 100 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing In re Armendarez-Mendez, 
24 I & N. Dec. at 653–60). 
 88 In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 660. 
 89 25 I. & N. Dec. 57, 60 (B.I.A. 2009). 
 90 Id.  
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citizen of Honduras, entered the United States without inspection on 
July 28, 1996.
91
  Then, in August 1996, the DHS served respondent 
with an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing.
92
  Respondent, 
however, did not appear for her deportation hearing two years later, 
at which point the IJ ordered her deported in absentia.
93
  Nine years 
later, on December 7, 2007, respondent filed a motion to reopen on 
the ground that she did not receive proper notice of the deportation 
hearing.
94
  Upholding the application of the departure bar, the IJ de-
nied respondent’s motion on January 17, 2008.
95
 
The Board read 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(g) as presupposing the existence 
of an outstanding order for deportation as the basis on which an 
alien’s “self-deportation” may deprive the court of jurisdiction to con-
sider the alien’s motion to reopen or reconsider.
96
  Examining the 
specific language used in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2),
97
 the 
Board focused on the usage of the term “rescinded” and noted that 
the term “rescind” means “to annul ab initio”
98
 when dealing with an 
in absentia deportation order.
99
  The Board then ruled that “[a]n in 
absentia deportation order issued in proceedings of which the res-
pondent had no notice is voidable from its inception and becomes a 
legal nullity upon its rescission, with the result that the respondent 
reverts to the same immigration status that he . . . possessed prior to 
entry of the order.”
100
  Ultimately, the Board concluded, as did the 
 
 91 Id. at 57. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id.  
 95 In re Bulnes-Nolasco, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 58.  Respondent then filed a motion for 
reconsideration, but the IJ denied that motion as well.  Id. 
 96 Id. at 59. 
 97 Regarding exceptions to filing deadlines, the regulation provides in relevant 
part: 
(A) An order entered in absentia in deportation proceedings may be 
rescinded only upon a motion to reopen filed: 
. . . .  
(2) At any time if the alien demonstrates that he or she did not receive 
notice or if the alien demonstrates that he or she was in federal or state 
custody and the failure to appear was through no fault of the alien.  
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2) (2011). 
 98 See In re M-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 349, 353 (B.I.A. 1998) (citing BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1306 (6th ed. 1990) (“‘[R]escission’ means to annul ab initio.”)).  “Ab 
initio” is a Latin term meaning “[f]rom the beginning.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 4 
(7th ed. 1999).   
 99 In re Bulnes-Nolasco, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 59. 
 100 Id.  
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Eleventh Circuit in Contreras-Rodriguez v. United States Attorney Gener-
al,
101
 “that an in absentia deportation order does not so qualify if it 
was issued in a proceeding of which the alien did not properly receive 
notice.”
102
 
The above-referenced cases illustrate the lack of predictability 
and uniformity in the BIA’s decisions.
103
  Despite having a long history 
of upholding the regulatory departure bars, the BIA has recently be-
gun modifying its jurisprudence in this area of the law.  As noted, the 
BIA deviated slightly from its longstanding practice of upholding the 
regulatory departure bar in In re Bulnes-Nolasco, which may suggest 
that the BIA is willing to assess the validity of departure bars separate-
ly in different contexts.
104
 
V. DEPARTURE BAR JURISPRUDENCE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
A. The Fourth Circuit’s William v. Gonzales 
Tunbosun Olawale William (“William”), a native and citizen of 
Nigeria, became a legal permanent resident of the United States in 
1996.
105
  One year later, a Maryland court sentenced William to prison 
and probation after he pled guilty to receipt of a stolen credit card in 
violation of Maryland law.
106
  Then, in November 1997, “the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (‘INS’) charged William with being 
removable as an aggravated felon for committing an offense involving 
fraud or deceit,” and subsequently “charged William with being re-
movable as having committed a crime of moral turpitude.”
107
  Ulti-
mately, an IJ found William removable based on his conviction of a 
 
 101 462 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2006).  See In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
646, 654 n.6 (B.I.A. 2008) (reserving decision on this issue). 
 102 In re Bulnes-Nolasco, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 59.  Finally, the Board remanded the 
matter to the IJ to allow him to decide whether the respondent’s in absentia deporta-
tion order was subject to rescission for lack of proper notice.  Id. at 60. 
 103 See David Isaacson, Filing and Adjudication of Motions to Reopen and Reconsider Af-
ter Departure from the United States, CYRUS D. MEHTA & ASSOCS., PLLC IMMIG. & NAT’LITY 
L. (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.cyrusmehta.com/ 
News.aspx?SubIdx=ocyrus201091310474&Month=&From=Menu&Page=19&Year=All 
(“Recent caselaw . . . indicates that this rule is not as uniform as many had previously 
supposed.”). 
 104 In re Bulnes-Nolasco, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 60; see infra Part IV.C. 
 105 William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 331 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 106 Id.  The court sentenced William “to eighteen months imprisonment, with 
nine months suspended and three years probation.”  Id. 
 107 Id.; see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(M), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) 
(2006). 
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crime of moral turpitude and ineligible for relief.
108
  The BIA af-
firmed the IJ’s decision and William did not seek further review in 
the Fourth Circuit.
109
  Government officials then removed William 
from the United States in July 2005.
110
 
Shortly after removal, William filed a petition for a writ of coram 
nobis
111
 in state court seeking to vacate his Maryland conviction.
112
  In 
October 2005, the state court granted William’s writ and vacated his 
conviction.
113
  Then, in December 2005, “William filed a motion to 
reopen immigration proceedings before the BIA” based on the ex-
ceptional circumstances of his case.
114
  The BIA denied his motion by 
holding that the departure bar under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) stripped 
the court of jurisdiction to consider William’s motion because he had 
already been removed from the country.
115
  At this point, William pe-
titioned the Fourth Circuit for review of the BIA’s application of the 
departure bar.
116
  William primarily argued that “the post-departure 
bar on motions to reopen[] is invalid because it conflicts with clear 
statutory language.”
117
  The government, however, argued that the sta-
tute is “silent with respect to post-departure motions to reopen in that it 
does not specifically address them,” and therefore the Attorney Gen-
eral’s regulations appropriately fill the gap.
118
 
Judge Shedd, writing for the majority, used the Chevron
119
 analysis 
to determine the validity of the Agency’s regulation.
120
  Beginning 
 
 108 William, 499 F.3d at 331. 
 109 Id.  William did, however, file a motion to reconsider with the BIA whereby he 
argued “that he had received limited post-conviction relief in the form of a reduction 
of sentence.”  Id.  The BIA denied this motion and, once again, William did not pur-
sue further review in the Fourth Circuit.  Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 See United States v. Denedo, 129 S. Ct. 2213, 2220 (2009) (“The writ of coram 
nobis is an ancient common-law remedy designed to correct errors of fact.”). 
 112 William, 499 F.3d at 331. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 331.  William argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) grants the right to 
reopen without regard to an alien’s physical presence in the country.  See id. at 332.  
This, he argued, conflicted with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), which limits the right based on 
the alien’s physical presence in the country.  See id. at 331–32. 
 118 William, 499 F.3d at 332. 
 119 Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Under the 
Chevron doctrine, a court must first consider “whether Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue.”  Id. at 842.  If so, the inquiry ends because both the 
court and the agency “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
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with the statutory provision, the court noted that 8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(c)(7)(A) provides that “‘[a]n alien may file one motion to 
reopen proceedings under this section.’”
121
  Given its precise lan-
guage, which explicitly provides for a temporal limitation but also 
specifically removes the prior codified geographical limitation, the 
court found that “§ 1229a(c)(7)(A) unambiguously provides an alien 
with the right to file one motion to reopen, regardless of whether he 
is within or without the country.”
122
  Thus, the Fourth Circuit forec-
losed the government’s argument that the statute “is silent with re-
spect to post-departure motions to reopen.”
123
 
Additionally, the court found that the “clarity and breadth of the 
statutory language likewise overc[a]me the Government’s argument 
that . . . Congress codified the right to file a motion to reopen while 
leaving the regulatory post-departure bar in place by not expressly 
repealing it.”
124
  According to the court, Congress clearly addressed 
and “at least implicitly repealed” the departure bar when it decided 
to grant “an alien” the right to move to reopen without further speci-
fying a physical presence requirement.
125
  Moreover, the court noted 
that the government’s argument also lacked contextual support be-
cause “one of IIRIRA’s aims is to expedite the removal of aliens from 
the country while permitting them to continue to seek review of their 
removal orders from abroad.”
126
 
The majority found that the overall structure of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a 
reinforced its interpretation of § 1229a(c)(7)(A) in two ways.
127
  First, 
Congress’s specific limitations on the right to file a motion to reopen 
supports the conclusion that § 1229a(c)(7)(A) cannot be read to ex-
clude aliens who have departed the country.
128
  Second, for motions 
 
Congress.”  Id. at 842–43.  On the other hand, if Congress has not addressed the 
question at issue, the court must determine “whether the agency’s answer is based on 
a permissible construction of the statute.”  Id. at 843. 
 120 William, 499 F.3d at 331. 
 121 Id. at 332 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)(2006)).  For the text of the cur-
rent departure bar see, infra Part VII. 
 122 William, 499 F.3d at 332. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at n.2. 
 125 Id.  
 126 Id. at n.3. 
 127 Id. at 333. 
 128 William, 499 F.3d at 333; see United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000) 
(“When Congress provides exceptions in a statute, it does not follow that courts have 
authority to create others.  The proper inference . . . is that Congress considered the 
issue of exceptions and, in the end, limited the statute to the ones set forth.”). 
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to reopen for victims of domestic violence under § 
1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV),
129
 Congress expressly included a physical 
presence requirement.
130
  Thus, the court drew a negative inference 
that, by not requiring physical presence in the statutory language of § 
1229a(c)(7)(A), Congress did not intend to limit such motions to 
reopen to aliens who have not departed the country.
131
  Further, the 
court also noted that if Congress had intended the departure bar to 
apply to all motions, the express language requiring physical pres-
ence for victims of domestic violence would be superfluous.
132
 
The majority concluded that congressional intent was unequi-
vocal: “§ 1229a(c)(7)(A) clearly and unambiguously grants an alien 
the right to file one motion to reopen, regardless of whether he is 
present in the United States when the motion is filed.”
133
  Therefore, 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) is in direct conflict with the clear language of the 
statute; the INA thereby removes any authority from the regulation 
and renders it invalid.
134
 
Chief Judge Williams dissented.
135
  The Chief Judge’s primary 
disagreements with the majority’s analysis were that Congress’s statu-
tory language did not repeal the regulatory departure bar and that 
the majority never engaged in the second step of the Chevron analy-
 
 129 The Act states in pertinent part: 
(iv) Special rule for battered spouses, children, and parents.  Any limi-
tation under this section on the deadlines for filing such motions shall 
not apply. 
 . . . . 
(IV) if the alien is physically present in the United States at the time of 
filing the motion. 
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV) (2006). 
 130 See William, 499 F.3d at 333. 
 131 Id.; see Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 528 (2003) (“[Where] Congress in-
cludes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section 
of the same Act . . . it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and pur-
posely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 132 See William, 499 F.3d at 333; see, e.g., TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 
(2001) (“It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon 
the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or 
word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.”). 
 133 William, 499 F.3d at 333; see In re Coleman, 426 F.3d 719, 725 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(“If the language is plain and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, we 
need not inquire further.”).  
 134 William, 499 F.3d at 334; see Allen v. United States, 173 F.3d 533, 536 (4th Cir. 
1999) (“[W]e must overturn a regulation that clearly conflicts with the plain text of 
the statute.”). 
 135 William, 499 F.3d at 334 (Williams, C.J., dissenting). 
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sis.
136
  Unlike the majority, the dissent could not get a “‘clear sense of 
congressional intent’ to repeal the departure bar simply because the 
numerical limitation on motions to reopen now occupies a place in 
the United States Code where previously it only existed in the Federal 
Register.”
137
  Chief Judge Williams further noted that, when viewed in 
its entirety, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) makes clear that the statute is 
nothing more than a numerical limitation on an alien’s ability to file 
a motion to reopen immigration proceedings.
138
  Moreover, the dis-
sent pointed out that Congress did not add the domestic violence ex-
ception’s physical presence requirement to § 1229a until 2000—
nearly a decade after IIRIRA’s enactment.
139
 
Under Chief Judge Williams’s own analysis of Chevron’s first step, 
he concluded that the statute is silent, and the agency is empowered 
by statute to issue regulations to dispel the silence.
140
  The Judge then 
proceeded to Chevron’s second step.
141
  Chief Judge Williams con-
cluded that the Attorney General’s reasoning that the goal of achiev-
ing finality in immigration matters outweighs the burdens associated 
with adjudicating motions to reopen filed on behalf of departed or 
removed aliens is reasonable enough to defer to the Attorney Gener-
al and thus uphold the regulation.
142
 
 
 136 See id. 
 137 Id. at 335 (quoting Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 
(2004)). 
 138 See id. at 336; see United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984) (“We do not 
. . . construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole.”). 
 139 William, 499 F.3d at 337 (Williams, C.J., dissenting); see Victims of Trafficking 
and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464.  According 
to Chief Judge Williams, this Act sought to “snuff out sex slave trade and domestic 
violence,” which is “connected neither in time nor purpose” to the IIRIRA amend-
ments regarding motions to reopen.  William, 499 F.3d at 337 (Williams, C.J., dissent-
ing).  Chief Judge Williams countered the “negative inference” argument by stating 
that “Congress is presumed to have known about and approved of the departure bar 
when it amended the INA without explicitly repealing it.”  Id. at 338–41.   
 140 See William, 499 F.3d at 342 (Williams, C.J., dissenting). 
 141 Chevron’s second step requires the court to determine whether the regulation 
is “reasonable in light of the legislature’s revealed design” in order to uphold the 
agency’s interpretation.  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 142 See id. at 345; Nat’l Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 146 (1920) (ex-
plaining that deference to an agency’s construction of a statute is “especially [appro-
priate] where such construction has been long continued”). 
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B. The Tenth Circuit’s Mendiola v. Holder 
Prior to the release of the Mendiola decision, but after briefing, 
the Tenth Circuit decided Rosillo-Puga v. Holder.
143
   Finding the case 
analogous to Mendiola’s, the Mendiola court relied heavily on the 
precedential effect of Rosillo-Puga.
144
 
1. Rosillo-Puga v. Holder 
In 2003, an IJ ordered Rosillo-Puga removed to Mexico.
145
  Three 
years later he filed a motion to reopen his proceedings with the IJ on 
the ground that the court could exercise sua sponte jurisdiction un-
der 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1)
146
 to consider his motion.
147
  The IJ de-
nied Rosillo-Puga’s motion, and the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, 
finding that § 1003.23(b)(1) deprived the IJ of jurisdiction to hear 
Rosillo-Puga’s motion to reopen proceedings because he had already 
departed the country.
148
 
Rosillo-Puga relied upon William v. Gonzales in making his argu-
ment that 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) permits “an alien” to file one 
motion to reopen regardless of whether that alien is inside or outside 
the United States.
149
  The Rosillo-Puga court, however, disagreed with 
the majority’s opinion in William and instead reached the same con-
clusion that was articulated in Chief Judge Williams’s dissent.
150
  As 
the court did in William, the Rosillo-Puga court applied the two-step 
Chevron test to review the Agency’s construction of the statute at is-
sue.
151
  First, the court analyzed Congress’s statutory language and 
found that it was “simply silent on the issue of whether it meant to 
repeal the post-departure bars contained in the Attorney General’s 
 
 143 580 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2009) (dealing with regulatory motions to reopen 
under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.23(b)(1), 1003.2(d)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010). 
 144 See Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303, 1304–05 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 502 (2010). 
 145 Id. at 1306 (citing Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1149).  This Part of the Comment 
focuses mainly on the Mendiola court’s iteration of the facts and holding of Rosillo-
Puga.  It is the author’s position that the precedential effect of Rosillo-Puga is better 
understood through the Mendiola court’s iteration of Rosillo-Puga’s facts and holding. 
 146 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (2011) (“An Immigration Judge may upon his or her 
own motion at any time . . . reopen or reconsider any case . . . .”). 
 147 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1306–07 (citing Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1150). 
 148 Id. at 1307. 
 149 See id.; see also William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 2007).  For a 
discussion of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (2006), see infra Part VII. 
 150 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1307. 
 151 Id. at 1307–08; see William, 499 F.3d at 331–32.   
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regulations.”
152
  The court then inquired into “whether the agency’s 
interpretation is ‘based on a permissible construction of the sta-
tute.’”
153
  Finding it “inconceivable” for Congress to have repealed the 
regulatory post-departure bar without stating anything about its forty-
year history in practice, the court upheld the post-departure bar as a 
valid regulation under the “Attorney General’s Congressionally-
delegated rulemaking authority, and [therefore ruled that the bar] 
does not contravene 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) or (7)(C).”
154
 
The Rosillo-Puga court ultimately upheld the BIA’s holdings that 
it lacked jurisdiction to hear Rosillo-Puga’s motion to reopen under 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) and that the BIA and IJ lacked sua sponte jurisdic-
tion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)
155
 to consider the motion to reopen.
156
  
The ruling, however, was not unanimous; Judge Lucero filed a lone 
dissent.
157
 
Judge Lucero reasoned that a plain reading of 8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(c)(6)(A) and (7)(A) “unambiguously guarantee[s] every alien 
the right to file . . . one motion to reopen removal proceedings, re-
gardless of whether the alien has departed from the United States.”
158
  
According to the dissent, Congress’s use of inclusive language in the 
 
 152 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1307–08 (quoting Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147, 
1157 (10th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 153 Id. at 1308 (quoting Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1157).   
 154 See id. (quoting Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1156) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 155 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2011) (“The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider 
on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.”); see 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.23(b)(1) (2011) (“An [IJ] may upon his or her own motion at any time . . . 
reopen or reconsider any case in which he or she has made a decision . . . .”). 
 156 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1308; see also Navarro-Miranda v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 672, 
675–76 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding the interpretation by the BIA that the departure bar 
removes its jurisdiction, including its sua sponte authority, to reopen the removal 
proceedings of a deported alien to be reasonable and upholding the same). 
 157 See Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1161–71 (Lucero, J., dissenting); see also Mendiola, 
585 F.3d at 1308 n.5.  For purposes of developing Judge Lucero’s arguments in his 
dissenting opinion in greater detail from that which is found in the Mendiola opi-
nion, this Comment will provide some additional information by analyzing text taken 
directly from Judge Lucero’s dissenting opinion in Rosillo-Puga.   
 158 Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1162 (Lucero, J., dissenting).  Under a different ap-
proach, Judge Lucero noted that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dada v. 
Mukasey “‘supports the conclusion that the post-departure bar is inconsistent with’ 
the statute because it ‘held all aliens have a statutory right to file one motion to reo-
pen’ pursuant to § 1229a(c)(7).”  Mindeola, 585 F.3d at 1308 n.5 (quoting Rosillo-
Puga, 580 F.3d at 1168 (Lucero, J., dissenting)); see Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 22 
(2008) (stating that a “more expeditious solution” to the problem would be to per-
mit aliens to file motions to reopen after they have left the country) (decided on 
other grounds). 
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terms “the alien” and “an alien” indicated Congress’s intent not to 
exclude a subclass of aliens—those who have departed and are thus 
outside the INA’s scope.
159
  Judge Lucero also found, as did the ma-
jority in William, that the textual contrast between the domestic vi-
olence section of the statute, which explicitly imposes a physical pres-
ence requirement, and other sections of the statute that do not, illu-
illustrates Congress’s intent not to place geographical limitations on 
all motions to reopen or reconsider.
160
  Such a reading, the dissent 
noted, would render the physical presence requirement under the 
domestic violence section “mere surplusage.”
161
 
2. Mendiola v. Holder 
Eddie Mendiola, a native and citizen of Peru, became a lawful 
permanent resident of the United States in April 1989.
162
  In July 1996 
and August 2000, a California state court convicted Mendiola of pos-
session of steroids.
163
  Subsequently, an Idaho state court convicted 
Mendiola of being an accessory to a felony in September 2003.
164
  
Thereafter, DHS officials detained and transported Mendiola to an 
immigration detention facility in Colorado.
165
  The DHS then com-
menced removal proceedings against Mendiola on grounds that he 
was an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.
166
 
Mendiola moved for a change of venue from the Tenth Circuit 
to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that his underlying conviction occurred 
in California and thus his case should fall within the Ninth Circuit’s 
jurisdiction.
167
  The IJ denied a change of venue, applied Tenth Cir-
cuit law, found that Mendiola was removable based upon his aggra-
vated felony conviction, and ordered him removed to Peru.
168
  The 
 
 159 Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1164 (Lucero, J., dissenting).  
 160 Id. at 1165; see also William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 161 Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1165 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (quoting William, 499 
F.3d at 333).  
 162 Mendiola v. Gonzales, 189 F. App’x 810, 812 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 163 Id.; see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11377(a) (West 2010).  On July 30, 1996, 
a California state court convicted Mendiola of misdemeanor possession in violation 
of a state law.  Mendiola, 189 F. App’x at 812.  Then, on August 7, 2000, the court 
convicted him of felony possession.  Id. 
 164 Mendiola, 189 F. App’x at 812. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id.; see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006) (defining aggravated felony to in-
clude a “drug-trafficking crime”); id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (pertaining to removabili-
ty).  
 167 Mendiola, 189 F. App’x at 812. 
 168 Id. 
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BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Mendiola’s appeal.
169
  
The BIA noted that the IJ properly applied Tenth Circuit law because 
“there [wa]s no reason to believe that the Tenth Circuit would apply 
Ninth Circuit law to determine [Mendiola’s] removability simply be-
cause [his] criminal conviction occurred within the territorial juris-
diction of the Ninth Circuit.”
170
 
Mendiola then petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review.
171
  While 
his petition was pending, government officials removed Mendiola to 
Peru in March 2005.
172
  The court then denied Mendiola’s petition.
173
  
Within two years, Mendiola returned to the United States illegally.
174
  
In 2007, Mendiola filed his first motion to reopen with the BIA while 
he was in federal custody for his illegal return.
175
  The BIA denied his 
motion on two grounds: (1) 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) stripped the BIA of 
jurisdiction to consider the motion, and (2) Mendiola’s motion was 
untimely because it was filed nearly three years after the expiration of 
the ninety-day limit imposed by § 1003.2(c)(2).
176
  Mendiola filed 
another petition in 2007.
177
  The BIA similarly denied this petition.
178
 
In 2008, Mendiola obtained new counsel and filed a second mo-
tion to reopen his proceedings on grounds that his former attorney’s 
ineffectiveness and the California court’s reduction of his second 
conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor in 2007 rendered it ap-
 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. (citing United States v. Castro-Rocha, 323 F.3d 846 (10th Cir. 2003) (apply-
ing Tenth Circuit law when deciding if conviction in a state outside Tenth Circuit’s 
jurisdiction constituted aggravated felony); Tapia-Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216 (10th 
Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 998 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(same)). 
 171 Id. at 811.   
 172 Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303, 1305 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 502 (2010). 
 173 Mendiola, 189 F. App’x at 815.  
 174 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305.  Shortly after Mendiola returned illegally to the 
United States, federal agents detained him on a charge of reentry after removal for 
an aggravated felony.  Id.  See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006). 
 175 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305. 
 176 Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2011) (“[A] party may file only one motion to 
reopen . . . proceedings (whether before the Board or the Immigration Judge) and 
that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final ad-
ministrative decision was rendered . . .”).  Mendiola’s final administrative order of 
removal was issued in 2004.  Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305. 
 177 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305.  
 178 Id.  Mendiola failed to argue in his briefs that § 1003.2(d) did not apply to his 
case.  Mendiola v. Mukasey, 280 F. App’x 719, 722 (10th Cir. 2008).   
BONILLA_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2012  6:17 PM 
2012] COMMENT 297 
 
propriate.
179
  The BIA denied Mendiola’s second motion to reopen, 
holding again that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter under 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) and that it also lacked authority to reopen the 
matter sua sponte under § 1003.2(a).
180
  In addition, the BIA found 
that Mendiola’s motion was deniable due to its untimeliness and to 
the numerical limitation placed on motions to reopen under § 
1003.2(c)(2).
181
  Undeterred, Mendiola once again filed a petition for 
review with the Tenth Circuit, which the court ultimately granted.
182
 
Circuit Judge Baldock, writing for the majority, began the 
court’s analysis with a look at the history of the post-departure bar in 
the United States and the IIRIRA’s enactment in 1996.
183
  The court 
noted that “for fifty years the BIA has consistently followed this ‘juris-
dictional principle,’ holding ‘that reopening is unavailable to any 
alien who departs the United States after being ordered removed.’”
184
  
After discussing the pertinent facts and holding of Rosillo-Puga, the 
court focused its attention on Mendiola’s primary arguments.  Men-
diola argued that the BIA erred when it held that 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2(d) deprived it of jurisdiction to hear his motion to reopen.
185
  
He also argued that “Rosillo-Puga did not extend the post-departure 
bar’s application to motions to reopen filed by aliens pursuant to 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) where the motion alleges ineffective assistance of 
counsel rising to the level of a due process violation.”
186
 
The court relied on Rosillo-Puga’s precedential effect to counter 
both arguments.
187
  First, the court, in accordance with stare decisis 
principles, upheld the Rosillo-Puga court’s conclusion that § 
1003.2(d) was valid.
188
  Second, finding that the language of 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2(c) “mirrors” the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7), which 
 
 179 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305. 
 180 Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2011) (“The Board may at any time reopen or re-
consider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.”). 
 181 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1305–06; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2011); see also 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2006) (containing similar language involving a ninety-day lim-
it).   
 182 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1306. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. (quoting In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 646, 648 (B.I.A. 2008)). 
 185 Id. at 1304.  
 186 Id. at 1309; see § 1003.2(c)(2) (2011).  
 187 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1310. 
 188 Id.; see Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147, 1156 (2009).  
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the Rosillo-Puga court addressed, the Mendiola court applied the same 
analysis to the present matter.
189
 
The court then iterated the Rosillo-Puga court’s conclusion that 
“Congress’s provision for one motion to reopen within 90 days of re-
moval in those statutory subsections does not alter the valid contin-
ued operation of the regulatory post-departure bar to motions to 
reopen.”
190
  The court then noted that the departure bar divested the 
BIA and IJ of jurisdiction in Rosillo-Puga under a similar regulatory 
departure bar and also specified that the court is “bound by the 
precedent.”
191
  Thus, the court held that the departure bar applied to 
Mendiola.
192
 
C. Additional Applications of the Departure Bar in the Federal Circuits 
As the case summaries above have shown, case law “indicates 
[that] this rule is not as uniform as many had previously supposed.”
193
  
“[A] substantial number of Court of Appeals and BIA cases have 
opened up the possibility that certain aliens may be able to file or 
pursue motions to reopen and reconsider even after departing from 
the United States.”
194
  To illustrate the disparities in departure bar ju-
risprudence in different areas of the country, this Comment will now 
consider a sample of pertinent circuit cases. 
1. The First Circuit Upholds Regulatory Departure Bar’s 
Validity 
In Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, the First Circuit held that the depar-
ture bar in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) was a valid jurisdictional limita-
tion on an IJ’s authority to consider a departed alien’s motion to 
reopen or reconsider proceedings.
195
  The First Circuit’s jurisdiction 
includes Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico, and 
Rhode Island.
196
  Therefore, a departed alien whose removal proceed-
 
 189 Mendiola, 585 F.3d at 1309–10. 
 190 Id. (citing Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1156).   
 191 Id. at 1310.  
 192 Id. 
 193 Isaacson, supra note 103. 
 194 Id.  
 195 489 F.3d 438, 443 (1st Cir. 2007) (en banc); see also Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 
650, 654 n.2 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that the Pena court rejected “the argument that 
the departure bar was impliedly repealed by the [IIRIRA]”); William v. Gonzales, 499 
F.3d 329, 345 n.6 (4th Cir. 2007) (Williams, C.J., dissenting). 
 196 See Court Locator, U.S. CRTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/court_locator.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2012).  
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ings have taken place or are taking place within the First Circuit’s ju-
risdiction will be barred from filing a motion to reopen the proceed-
ings. 
2. The Second Circuit Holds that the BIA Cannot 
Constrict Its Congressionally-Given Jurisdiction 
In Zhang v. Holder, the Second Circuit upheld as reasonable the 
BIA’s decision to bar the petitioner’s motion to reopen removal pro-
ceedings seeking the court’s sua sponte authority under 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2(a) because of the particular historical evolution of the regula-
tion and because the alien had departed the country.
197
  More specifi-
cally, the court upheld as “not plainly erroneous” the BIA’s interpre-
tation that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) deprives the Board of jurisdiction to 
hear petitioner’s motion to reopen sua sponte.
198
  In 2011, however, 
the Second Circuit revisited the departure bar issue and reached a 
different result in Luna v. Holder.
199
  While following an approach sim-
ilar to the Sixth
200
 and Seventh Circuits’,
201
 the court in Luna held that 
the “BIA may not contract the jurisdiction that Congress gave it by 
applying the departure bar regulation [under] 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2(d) . . . to statutory motions to reopen.”
202
  According to the 
court, Congress did not make jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(c)(7) dependent upon whether an alien is present within the 
United States.
203
  Rather, the IIRIRA repealed the statutory bar to de-
parted aliens that had already been in place.
204
  Ultimately, the court 
held that “the BIA must exercise its full jurisdiction to adjudicate a 
statutory motion to reopen by an alien who is removed or otherwise 
departs the United States before or after filing the motion.”
205
  Thus, 
a departed alien who was subject to or is subject to removal proceed-
 
 197 Zhang, 617 F.3d at 661. 
 198 Id. at 652. 
 199 637 F.3d 85, 100 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 200 See discussion infra Part V.C.6. 
 201 See discussion infra Part V.C.7. 
 202 Luna, 637 F.3d at 100. 
 203 Id. at 101. 
 204 Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (repealed 1996). 
 205 Luna, 637 F.3d at 102.  The court declined, however, to determine the validity 
of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) in every possible context.  Id.  Thus, it is not clear how the 
court will rule on an issue regarding the regulatory sua sponte motion to reopen.   
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ings in Connecticut, New York, or Vermont is not barred from filing a 
statutory motion to reopen.
206
 
3. The Third Circuit Holds Post-Departure Bar Conflicts 
with Clear Congressional Intent 
In an unpublished opinion in 2009, the Third Circuit upheld 
the validity of the departure bar contained in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), 
pertaining to motions to reopen or reconsider before the BIA.
207
  In 
2010, the Third Circuit held the BIA’s interpretation of the regulato-
ry departure bar in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(e)
208
 to be incorrect because the 
Board equated the word “departure” with “deportation” and/or “re-
mov[al].”
209
  In its decision, the court noted that although an alien 
who voluntarily departs during deportation proceedings may be 
deemed to have waived his or her right to appeal, “it is less equitable 
to so deem an alien who was involuntarily removed . . . .”
210
 
More recently, the Third Circuit unequivocally held that “the 
post-departure bar regulation [under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d)] conflicts 
with Congress’[s] clear intent for several reasons.”
211
  Those reasons 
included, among others, that the “plain text of the statute provides 
each ‘alien’ with the right to file one motion to reopen”; that Con-
gress incorporated geographical limitations in a subsequent addition 
to the IIRIRA but did not add a geographical limitation to the overall 
statute generally; and that “Congress specifically withdrew the statu-
tory post-departure bar to judicial review in conformity with IIRIRA’s 
purpose of speeding departure, but improving accuracy.”
212
  The 
Third Circuit’s jurisdiction includes Delaware, New Jersey, and Penn-
sylvania.
213
  Therefore, aliens whose judicial proceedings took place in 
 
 206 The Second Circuit’s jurisdiction comprises these states.  See Court Locator, su-
pra note 196. 
 207 Tahiraj-Dauti v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 323 F. App’x 138, 139 (3d Cir. 2009); see infra 
text accompanying note 266. 
 208 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(e) (2011) (“Departure from the United States of a person 
who is the subject of deportation proceedings, prior to the taking of an appeal from 
a decision in his or her case, shall constitute a waiver of his or her right to appeal.”). 
 209 Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 394 F. App’x 941, 944–55 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 210 Id. at 945 (emphasis added); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(e) (2011) (pertaining to 
waivers of appeal). 
 211 Espinal v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213, 224 (3d Cir. 2011).  Although this case 
dealt specifically with the motion-to-reconsider portion of the regulation, the court 
noted that the analysis for the motion to reopen is the same and thus if one portion 
is invalid, the other is as well.  Id. at 217 n.3.   
 212 Id. at 224. 
 213 See Court Locator, supra note 196. 
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these states will not be jurisdictionally barred solely because they have 
filed motions to reopen after departing the United States. 
4. The Fourth Circuit Holds that Regulatory Departure 
Bars Are Always Invalid 
As noted in greater detail above,
214
 the Fourth Circuit holds that 
the departure bar contained in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) clearly conflicts 
with the statutory language in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) and there-
fore is rendered invalid.
215
  Thus, an alien who faces removal proceed-
ings in Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, or West 
Virginia is not jurisdictionally barred from filing a motion to reopen 
or reconsider solely because the alien has departed the country.
216
 
5. The Fifth Circuit Upholds Regulatory Departure Bar’s 
Validity 
In 2003, the Fifth Circuit in Ovalles v. Holder ruled that the BIA’s 
decision—that the departure bar in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) deprived the 
BIA of the jurisdiction to sua sponte consider a motion to reopen 
filed by an alien who has departed the country following termination 
of removal proceedings—was proper.
217
  More recently, the court di-
rectly ruled on the regulatory departure bar’s validity in Toora v. 
Holder.
218
  In Toora, the court held that the departure bar contained in 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) “applied to an alien who departed the U.S. 
after receiving notice of his deportation proceeding, but before the 
proceeding was completed and the [IJ] entered a deportation or-
der.”
219
  Thus, individuals whose removal proceedings have already 
 
 214 See supra Part V.A. 
 215 William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 331 (4th Cir. 2007).  
 216 The Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction comprises these states.  See Court Locator, supra 
note 196. 
 217 577 F.3d 288, 299–300 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding no need to squarely address the 
validity of § 1003.2(d) because the motion to reopen was untimely); see Navarro-
Miranda v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding 8 C.F.R. § 
3.2(d)—the predecessor to § 1003.2(d)—as a valid restriction on the BIA’s jurisdic-
tion to hear an alien’s motion to reopen once that alien has departed the United 
States).  See generally Emma Rebhorn, Note, Ovalles v. Holder: Better Late than . . . on 
Time? The Fifth Circuit Avoids Ruling on the Validity of the Postdeparture Bar, 84 TUL. L. 
REV. 1347 (discussing how the Fifth Circuit avoided directly addressing the validity of 
the departure bar at issue). 
 218 603 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 219 Toora v. Holder, No. 09-60073, FINDLAW (Apr. 9, 2010, 12:03 PM), 
http://blogs.findlaw.com/fifth_circuit/2010/04/toora-v-holder-no-09-60073.html 
(discussing Toora, 603 F.3d at 288). 
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been terminated and individuals who are presently subject to removal 
proceedings in Louisiana, Mississippi, or Texas, and have departed 
the United States either after completion of their removal proceed-
ings or prior to an official removal order, will be barred from moving 
to reopen or reconsider their proceedings.
220
 
6. The Sixth Circuit Holds that the BIA Cannot Constrict 
Its Jurisdiction to Hear Statutorily Created Motions to 
Reopen 
In 2007, the Sixth Circuit simply noted in a footnote in Ablahad 
v. Gonzales that petitioner’s “motions to reopen were also barred by 8 
C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d) and 1003.23(b)(1).”
221
 Two years later, however, 
the court addressed the particular matter at issue in Madrigal v. Holder 
with finality when it held that the departure bar rule under 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.4
222
 does not apply to aliens who have been involuntarily re-
moved from the United States.
223
  In 2011, the Sixth Circuit resolved 
all of the outstanding issues concerning the departure bar’s applica-
tion in Pruidze v. Holder, where the court held that the BIA cannot 
curtail its own jurisdiction to entertain a departed alien’s motion to 
reopen.
224
  First, the court explicitly stated that “no statute gives the 
[BIA] purchase for disclaiming jurisdiction to entertain a motion to 
reopen filed by aliens who have left the country.”
225
  Second, the court 
explained that a line of recent Supreme Court decisions makes clear 
that the BIA’s authority is to interpret the regulation as a mandatory 
legal rule and not as jurisdictional.
226
  Absent a statute providing the 
BIA with such authority, “the agency may not disclaim jurisdiction to 
 
 220 The Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction comprises these states.  See Court Locator, supra 
note 196. 
 221 217 F. App’x 470, 475 n.6 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 222 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4 (2011) (pertaining to withdrawal of appeal). 
 223 572 F.3d 239, 243–45 (6th Cir. 2009); see Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 
591, 594 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that the Sixth Circuit is one of two circuits that hold 
departure bars inapplicable to involuntarily removed aliens).  Involuntary removal 
entails a government-induced removal.  See Coyt v. Holder, 595 F.3d 902, 907 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (“[T]he physical removal of a petitioner by the United States does not 
preclude the petitioner from pursuing a motion to reopen.”). 
 224 632 F.3d 234, 237–38 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 225 Id. at 237. 
 226 Id. at 238 (citing Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010); Un-
ion Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 130 S. Ct. 584 (2009); Bowles v. Rus-
sell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006); Kontrick v. 
Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004); Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998)). 
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handle a motion to reopen that Congress empowered it to resolve.”
227
  
Thus, the BIA erred when it held that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) deprived it 
of jurisdiction to entertain Pruidze’s motion.
228
  It follows that an 
alien whose removal proceedings took place in Kentucky, Michigan, 
Ohio, or Tennessee and has since departed the country voluntarily or 
involuntarily may file a motion to reopen his or her proceedings.
229
 
7. The Seventh Circuit Holds that the BIA Cannot 
Constrict Its Jurisdiction 
The Seventh Circuit’s approach is similar to the Sixth Circuit’s.  
In Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, the Seventh Circuit struck down the de-
parture bar under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) as invalid because an agency 
is not entitled to “contract its own jurisdiction by regulations or by 
decisions in litigated proceedings.”
230
  Thus, “until the BIA rethinks 
the theoretical basis for the departure bar . . . motions to reopen . . . 
will survive an alien’s departure in the Seventh Circuit as well.”
231
  It 
follows that aliens who are or were subjected to removal proceedings 
in Illinois, Indiana, or Wisconsin, have since departed the country, 
and wish to move to reopen their removal proceedings are not juris-
dictionally barred simply due to the regulatory departure bar’s physi-
cal presence requirement.
232
 
8. The Ninth Circuit Holds the Regulatory Departure Bar 
Inapplicable to Involuntarily Removed Aliens 
In 2007, the Lin v. Gonzales
233
 court relied “on the rule of lenity 
to hold that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) does not deprive an IJ of juris-
diction to consider a motion to reopen filed by a removed alien” so 
long as the regulation is explicitly phrased in the present tense.
234
  
 
 227 Id. at 239. 
 228 Id. at 241. 
 229 The Sixth Circuit’s jurisdiction comprises these states.  See Court Locator, supra 
note 196. 
 230 612 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2010) (“We think that Union Pacific is dispositive in 
favor of the holding in William—though on a rationale distinct from the [F]ourth 
[C]ircuit’s.”); Union Pac. R.R., 130 S. Ct. 584; see also ROSENBLOOM ET AL., supra note 
3, at 6–7 (noting that the court in Marin-Rodriguez held that the regulations are not 
jurisdictional, and thus, the BIA cannot decline a motion to reopen on that ground). 
 231 See Isaacson, supra note 103. 
 232 The Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction comprises these states.  See Court Locator, su-
pra note 196. 
 233 473 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 234 Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 659 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Lin, 473 F.3d at 982).  
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Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit held in Coyt v. Holder that the regula-
tory departure bar rule is not applicable to aliens who were involunta-
rily removed from the United States.
235
  More recently, in Reyes-Torres 
v. Holder, the court upheld its ruling in Coyt and reiterated that Con-
gress’s intent in enacting IIRIRA is clear: “Congress anticipated that 
petitioners would be able to pursue relief after departing from the 
United States.”
236
  In particular, the court held that 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2(d) did not deprive the BIA of jurisdiction to entertain Reyes-
Torres’s motion to reopen his case after being removed from the 
United States.
237
  Thus, the departure bar’s physical presence re-
quirement is clearly inapplicable in cases where removal proceedings 
have been completed and the alien has been removed.  The Ninth 
Circuit’s jurisdiction includes Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington.
238
 
9. The Tenth Circuit Holds that Regulatory Departure 
Bars Are Always Valid 
The Tenth Circuit’s approach to departure-bar case law is in di-
rect contrast to the Fourth Circuit’s.  In Mendiola v. Holder, the Tenth 
Circuit held that the departure bar in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) does not 
conflict with the statutory language of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) and 
therefore is a valid regulation applicable to departed aliens.
239
  The 
court recently upheld the departure bar’s validity once again in Con-
treras-Bocanegra v. Holder.
240
  In Contreras-Bocanegra, the court held that 
the departure bar under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) divested the BIA of ju-
risdiction to hear petitioner’s motion to reopen despite the timeli-
ness of said motion because the motion was filed after petitioner de-
parted the country.
241
  Therefore, an alien who faces removal 
proceedings in Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, or 
 
 235 593 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[Section 1003.2(d)] cannot apply to cause 
the withdrawal of an administrative petition filed by a petitioner who has been invo-
luntarily removed . . . .”); see Marin-Rodriguez, 612 F.3d at 594 (noting that the Sixth 
Circuit is one of two circuits that hold departure bars inapplicable to involuntarily 
removed aliens).  See generally Susan Kilgore, Developments in the Judicial Branch: Ninth 
Circuit Issues Decision in Coyt v. Holder, Invalidating Departure Bar on Motions to Reopen 
and Creating Circuit Split, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 383 (2010). 
 236 645 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Coyt, 593 F.3d at 906) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 237 Id. at 1077. 
 238 See Court Locator, supra note 196. 
 239 585 F.3d 1303, 1308 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010). 
 240 629 F.3d 1170, 1172 (10th Cir. 2010).    
 241 Id. at 1171–72. 
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Wyoming is jurisdictionally barred from filing a motion to reopen or 
reconsider after departing from the United States.
242
 
10. The Eleventh Circuit Upholds the Regulatory 
Departure Bar as Valid 
Sankar v. United States Attorney General is an unpublished opinion 
addressing the applicability of the regulatory departure bar.
243
  Ulti-
mately, the court in Sankar specifically upheld the departure bar in 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) as applied to motions to reopen or reconsider 
before an IJ.
244
  If the court’s analysis does not change, aliens who 
were or are subject to removal proceedings in Alabama, Florida, or 
Georgia, and have since departed will not be permitted to file mo-
tions to reopen or reconsider.
245
 
11. The Varying Approaches of the Circuit Courts of 
Appeals 
The aforementioned cases illustrate the lack of consistency in 
the courts’ application of the departure bar and the recent trend 
among the circuit courts of appeals of invalidating regulatory post-
departure bars.  More importantly, the cases also highlight the 
nuances in different circuit holdings of how narrowly or broadly the 
provisions are interpreted.  Such concerns indicate a need for change 
in this context.  The needed change, however, will require either a 
Supreme Court ruling or an amendment to the INA’s statutory lan-
guage. 
VI. AN ARGUMENT FOR MODIFICATION OR ABOLISHMENT OF THE 
REGULATORY DEPARTURE BAR 
As evidenced throughout this Comment, there is a lack of un-
iformity among the U.S. circuit courts of appeals’ departure bar juri-
sprudence in the immigration context.  Specifically, the circuit courts 
are divided on the applicability and/or validity of the physical pres-
ence requirement in the departure bars—these “[d]ifferences in le-
 
 242 See Court Locator, supra note 196. 
 243 284 F. App’x 798 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 244 Id. at 799. 
 245 See Court Locator, supra note 196. 
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gal rules applied by the circuits result in unequal treatment of citi-
zens . . . solely because of differences in geography.”
246
 
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee (“Study Commit-
tee”) examined inter-circuit conflicts and “recommended that the 
Federal Judicial Center ‘study the number and frequency of unre-
solved conflicts’ to determine how many were ‘intolerable.’”
247
  The 
Study Committee’s report defined “intolerable” conflicts in the court 
system to include circumstances when the lack of uniformity “encou-
rages forum shopping among circuits [or] creates unfairness to liti-
gants in different circuits . . . [or] encourages non-acquiescence by 
federal administrative agencies, by forcing them to choose between 
the uniform administration of statutory schemes and obedience to 
the different holdings of courts in different regions.”
248
  Given these 
guidelines, the current regulatory departure bar conflicts in the dif-
ferent circuits are clearly “intolerable” conflicts. 
Such longstanding conflicts are causes for concern, especially 
considering the existence of Supreme Court Rule 10 (“Rule 10”), 
which provides guidance for the Court’s discretionary power to 
choose which writs of certiorari to grant.
249
  One guiding principle the 
Supreme Court uses in considering a petition is whether a “[U.S.] 
court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision 
of another [U.S.] court of appeals on the same important matter.”
250
  
Interestingly, at least one commentator has said that Rule 10 is partly 
derived from former President and Chief Justice Taft’s vision for the 
Supreme Court; a vision that involved “two broad objectives: (i) to re-
solve important questions of law, and (ii) to maintain uniformity in 
federal law.”
251
 
Although one commentator has noted that maintaining unifor-
mity in federal law “has fallen by the wayside” since the retirement in 
 
 246 COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND 
INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 
206–07 (1975). 
 247 Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1582 (2008)  (quot-
ing JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U. S., FED. COURTS STUDY COMM’N, REPORT OF THE 
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMISSION 124–25 (1990) [hereinafter FED. COURTS STUDY 
COMM. REPORT]). 
 248 Id. (quoting FED. COURTS STUDY COMM’N REPORT at 124–25)(internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 249 SUP. CT. R. 10. 
 250 SUP. CT. R. 10(a). 
 251 Kenneth W. Star, The Supreme Court and its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William 
Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1365 (2006) (emphasis added).  
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1993 of Justice White
252
—who openly advocated that a primary aim of 
the Court is “to provide some degree of coherence and uniformity in 
federal law throughout the land”
253
—it is still an objective the Court 
generally adheres to.  As Justice Scalia noted, “The principal purpose 
of this Court’s exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction is to clarify the 
law.”
254
  Nonetheless, petitioning the Court to resolve an inter-circuit 
conflict does not guarantee that the petition will be granted, but the 
“likelihood that the Court will grant review increases markedly.”
255
 
Unfortunately, however, some conflicts among the circuits can 
persist for years before the Supreme Court finally decides to hear the 
matter.
256
  Specifically, in the departure bar context, the Supreme 
Court has rejected certiorari in at least three cases since 2008.
257
  It is 
not clear at this point whether the Supreme Court will grant certiora-
ri to clarify the matter at issue, especially since “relatively few immi-
gration cases are taken up by the Supreme Court.”
258
 
Additionally, as noted above, lack of uniformity may lead parties, 
both governmental entities as well as private parties, to engage in fo-
rum shopping, and it certainly fosters less predictability in the law, 
which raises questions of fundamental fairness concerning similarly 
situated persons in different locations being treated differently under 
the same laws.
259
  Such uncertainty also raises philosophical questions 
about the overall effectiveness of our court system.
260
  Further, uni-
 
 252 Id.  See generally Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: White Announces He’ll Step 
Down From High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1993, at 1. 
 253 Byron R. White, The Work of the Supreme Court: A Nuts and Bolts Description, 54 
N.Y. ST. B. J. 346, 349 (1982). 
 254 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2274 (2009) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); see, e.g., Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 7 (2008) (“[The Court] granted 
certiorari . . . to resolve the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals.”); Whorton 
v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 415 (2007) (stating that the Court “granted certiorari to 
resolve th[e] conflict” among courts of appeals and state supreme courts). 
 255 Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Setting the Social Agenda: De-
ciding to Review High-Profile Cases at the Supreme Court, 57 KAN. L. REV. 313, 319 (2009). 
 256 See, e.g., Bryan M. Shay, Note, “So I Says to ‘the Guy,’ I Says . . .”: The Constitutio-
nality of Neutral Pronoun Redaction in Multidefendant Criminal Trials, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 345, 365 (2006) (“This relatively even split in the circuits persisted for almost 
twenty years until the Court finally got the chance to settle the debate . . . .”). 
 257  Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 502 
(2010); Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
502 (2010); Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 258 Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 27, at 49.  
 259 See supra text accompanying notes 23–27, 29. 
 260 For example, given the importance of maintaining uniformity throughout 
American jurisprudence, as seen in the due process and equal protection clauses of 
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form application of the law can improve judicial efficiency by limiting 
the amount of resources that courts expend deciphering a law’s ap-
plicability when different circuits have such varying approaches to the 
same issue. 
First, forum shopping is a practice that our courts greatly des-
pise.
261
  For this reason, courts are encouraged to “consider the twin 
aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoid-
ance of inequitable administration of the laws.”
262
  Litigants, however, 
may undertake such gamesmanship when the legal environment pro-
vides them with the opportunity to receive a more favorable outcome 
in a different jurisdiction. 
Second, “[l]ack of predictability” is also of great concern; it is 
“detrimental to citizens of foreign countries, citizens of the United 
States, and to the United States as a country.”
263
  Such unpredictability 
“may frustrate the reasonable expectations of litigants and lead to 
disparate results across the states.”
264
  Instead, courts should strive to 
achieve predictability because it “helps determine the precedent to 
which a court should adhere, and it ‘encourage[s] reliance on adju-
dication.’”
265
  In addition, predictability of the law can further assist 
an attorney in advising clients and preparing clients’ cases. 
Third, the current lack of uniformity leads to fundamental un-
fairness in our legal system.  As indicated throughout this Comment, 
an alien who was subject to removal proceedings in state A may be 
unable to file a motion to reopen his or her proceedings, but would 
be permitted to do so if he or she had faced removal proceedings in 
State B.  This is not a situation in which state laws mandate a variation 
of results because different states have different laws or word those 
laws differently.  Rather, this is a situation in which federal statutory 
law and federal regulations are interpreted differently although the 
language contained therein is the same.  As a result, similarly situated 
persons in different areas are not treated the same. 
 
the Constitution, should changes be made to the American court system so that such 
inter-circuit conflicts do not persist for several years? 
 261 See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  
 262 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1448 
n.2 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. at 77–79. 
 263 Christina Manfredi, Comment, Waiving Goodbye to Personal Jurisdiction Defenses: 
Why United States Courts Should Maintain a Rebuttable Presumption of Preclusion and Waiv-
er Within the Context of International Litigation, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 233, 258 (2008). 
 264 Id. at 238 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 265 Id. at 256–57 (quoting Estabrook v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 283, 289 (1998)). 
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Finally, judicial efficiency may be improved by increasing un-
iformity in this context.  Courts may be able to save limited resources 
by not having to decipher what exactly the law in each circuit is or 
will be.  Lower courts will have more guidance and clarity to rule on 
issues pertaining to motions filed by departed aliens.  The BIA and 
immigration courts may also experience an improvement in efficien-
cy.  As the BIA has explicitly indicated, it will apply the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s interpretation of departure bar jurisprudence only in the 
Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction.  Thus, the BIA will continue to rely on 
its own interpretation of the regulatory departure bars in other cir-
cuits.  This practice may lead to more cases being overturned—if the 
circuit does not agree with the BIA’s approach, as shown in Part 
VII—which results in more litigation and greater use of resources.  
Absent a Supreme Court ruling on the matter, in order to resolve 
these concerns, Congress should modify the INA’s statutory language 
or abolish regulatory departure bars entirely. 
VII.     MODIFICATIONS AND AMENDMENTS 
There are several different ways to modify or amend the lan-
guage in the regulatory departure bars as well as the relevant INA sta-
tutes.  This Part’s objective is to propose a modification or amend-
ment that will result in uniformity among the circuits.  For illustrative 
purposes, this Part will use the language contained in the departure 
bar under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), which provides: 
(d) Departure, deportation, or removal.  A motion to reopen or a 
motion to reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf of a per-
son who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal pro-
ceedings subsequent to his or her departure from the United 
States.  Any departure from the United States, including the de-
portation or removal of a person who is the subject of exclusion, 
deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of 
a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a 
withdrawal of such motion.
266
 
 
 266 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2011) (pertaining to the BIA).  
In general . . . A motion to reopen or to reconsider shall not be made 
by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of removal, deportation, 
or exclusion proceedings subsequent to his or her departure from the 
United States.  Any departure from the United States, including the 
deportation or removal of a person who is the subject of exclusion, de-
portation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a mo-
tion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall constitute a withdrawal 
of such motion. 
Id. § 1003.23(b)(1)(pertaining to Immigration Court). 
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Similarly, this section will use the language contained in the INA 
under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(A)–(C), which provides: 
(c) Decision and burden of proof. 
. . . . 
(7) Motions to reopen 
(A) In general. An alien may file one motion to reopen proceed-
ings under this section, except that this limitation shall not apply 
so as to prevent the filing of one motion to reopen described in 
subparagraph (C)(iv). 
(B) Contents. The motion to reopen shall state the new facts that 
will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, 
and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. 
(C) Deadline. 
(i) In general. Except as provided in this subparagraph, the mo-
tion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of 
a final administrative order of removal.
267
 
It is evident from the different circuit courts’ holdings that mod-
ifying the regulatory departure bars will not resolve all of the current 
conflicts.
268
  As previously indicated, the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, 
and Seventh Circuits hold that the BIA either cannot constrict its 
congressionally-granted jurisdiction or that the regulatory departure 
bars are rendered invalid by the clear language found within the per-
tinent section(s) of the INA.
269
  Each of the circuits, however, ac-
knowledges that the INA’s statutory language is controlling.
270
  The 
differences lie in how each circuit interprets this language.  There-
fore, a realistic solution to the current conflicts, absent a Supreme 
Court ruling directly on point, involves amending the INA’s statutory 
language. 
There are two possible modifications that are most reasonable in 
this context: one that includes statutory language requiring a geo-
graphic presence for all motions to reopen or one that includes statu-
tory language explicitly stating that no such geographic presence is 
required.  Beginning with the former, such an amendment could in-
clude: (1) language contained in current regulatory departure bars, 
in addition to explicit language to include (2) aliens who were the 
subject of removal proceedings, (3) aliens who voluntarily departed 
 
 267 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)–(C) (2006) (additional provisions under subsection 
(C) omitted). 
 268 See discussion supra Part V. 
 269 See discussion supra Part V. 
 270 See discussion supra Part V. 
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the country, and (4) aliens who involuntarily departed.  The amend-
ment could be structured as follows: 
(7) Motions to reopen. 
(A) In general. An alien may file one motion to reopen proceed-
ings under this section, except that this limitation shall not apply 
so as to prevent the filing of one motion to reopen described in 
subparagraph (C)(iv). 
(i) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to an alien who is the subject of re-
moval proceedings or was the subject of removal proceedings wherein a fi-
nal order had been issued subsequent to his or her voluntary or involunta-
ry departure from the United States.  Any departure from the United 
States, including the deportation or removal of a person who is the subject 
of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing 
of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a with-
drawal of such motion. 
. . . . 
(C) Deadline. 
(i) In general. Except as provided in this subparagraph, the mo-
tion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of 
a final administrative order of removal. 
Although such statutory amendment would resolve the conflicts 
among all of the circuit courts, it would be contrary to Congress’s in-
tent of improving the expedition of removing aliens in enacting the 
IIRIRA.
271
  The court in Coyt explained that the IIRIRA “‘inverted’ 
certain provisions of the INA, encouraging prompt voluntary depar-
ture and speedy government action, while eliminating prior statutory 
barriers to pursuing relief from abroad.”
272
  The court continued by 
explaining that prior to the IIRIRA “removal of a petitioner from the 
United States precluded courts from exercising jurisdiction over peti-
tions for review.”
273
  Therefore, at the time when orders of final re-
moval were pending, aliens were granted automatic stays.
274
  The 
“IIRIRA changed that by lifting the prior statutory bar over courts ex-
ercising jurisdiction over departed aliens, removing the automatic 
 
 271 See Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Congress wished to ex-
pedite the physical removal of those aliens not entitled to admission to the United 
States, while at the same time increasing the accuracy of such determinations.”). 
 272 Id. (quoting Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1755 (2009)); see also Espinal v. 
U.S. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213, 224 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting the “IIRIRA’s purpose of 
speeding departure, but improving accuracy”); Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 101 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (illustrating the same point as in Coyt by quoting the identical language 
from Nken). 
 273 Coyt, 593 F.3d at 906. 
 274 Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3) (repealed 1996). 
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stay provision upon petition for review, and informing the Attorney 
General that removal need not be deferred.”
275
  The court in Coyt 
then concluded that “the intent of Congress is clear” in that when 
Congress enacted the IIRIRA it “anticipated that petitioners would be 
able to pursue relief after departing from the United States.”
276
 
Additional insights into the IIRIRA’s structural meanings were 
discussed in William v Gonzales.
277
  The majority in William made clear 
that Congress’s use of the term “alien” does not distinguish between 
aliens within or without the country; that Congress enacted limita-
tions in the section at issue, but a geographical limitation for de-
parted aliens is not included; and that Congress’s explicit physical re-
quirement under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV)
278
 would be 
rendered superfluous if Congress already geographically limited mo-
tions to reopen or reconsider for aliens.
279
  Therefore, the amend-
ment proposed above would be contrary to the IIRIRA’s original 
purpose. 
Perhaps then the more appropriate method to resolve the lack 
of uniformity without frustrating the IIRIRA’s purpose or congres-
sional intent would be an amendment to the statutory language that 
explicitly states that an alien may file one motion to reopen whether 
he or she (1) is the subject of or (2) was the subject of removal pro-
ceedings, regardless of whether the alien (3) voluntarily or (4) invo-
luntarily departed the country.  For example, 
(7) Motions to reopen. 
 
 275 Coyt, 593 F.3d at 906; see IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009, 
3009-612 (1996) (repealing 8 U.S.C. § 1105a); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(3)(B), 
1252(b)(8)(C) (2006); see also Espinal, 653 F.3d at 224 (“Congress specifically with-
drew the statutory post-departure bar to judicial review.”).   
 276 Coyt, 593 F.3d at 906 (emphasis added); see also Luna, 637 F.3d at 101 (stating 
that Congress has done nothing since enacting IIRIRA to indicate “that an alien’s 
departure after filing a motion to reopen should be a jurisdictional bar”); Reyes-
Torres v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Coyt’s language re-
garding Congress’s intent in enacting IIRIRA). 
 277 499 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 278 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV) (2006) (“(iv) Special rule for battered 
spouses, children, and parents.  Any limitation under this section on the deadlines 
for filing such motions shall not apply. . . . (IV) if the alien is physically present in the 
United States at the time of filing the motion.”) 
 279 William, 499 F.3d at 332–33; see also Espinal, 653 F.3d at 224 (providing similar 
arguments in its reasons why “the post-departure bar regulation conflicts with Con-
gress’ clear intent”); Luna, 637 F.3d at 101 (discussing Congress’s explicit physical 
presence requirement for the domestic violence section and how “Congress’s choice 
to include this limitation in only one small subsection makes significant its decision 
to omit such a requirement from the rest of the law”). 
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(A) In general. An alien may file one motion to reopen proceed-
ings under this section, except that this limitation shall not apply 
so as to prevent the filing of one motion to reopen described in 
subparagraph (C)(iv). 
(i) Subparagraph (A) shall apply to an alien who is the subject of exclu-
sion, deportation, or removal proceedings or was the subject of removal 
proceedings wherein a final order had been issued subsequent to his or her 
voluntary or involuntary departure from the United States.  Any departure 
from the United States, including the deportation or removal of a person 
who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings, occur-
ring after the filing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall 
not constitute a withdrawal of such motion. 
. . . . 
(C) Deadline. 
(i) In general. Except as provided in this subparagraph, the mo-
tion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of 
a final administrative order of removal. 
This approach would essentially abolish the regulatory departure 
bar rule by explicitly stating in the INA’s statutory language that an 
alien who files a motion to reopen or reconsider his or her immigra-
tion proceedings is not be jurisdictionally barred from doing so solely 
due to the alien’s geographic location.  More importantly, such an 
amendment could bring the needed uniformity in each circuit’s cur-
rent approach to the departure bar’s application in the immigration 
context.  For example, the circuits that relied upon the Attorney 
General’s discretionary power to issue regulations as the reason to 
render such departure bars valid would no longer be able to uphold a 
BIA’s or an IJ’s denial of a motion on such jurisdictional grounds.
280
  
In addition, the Ninth Circuit would no longer need to distinguish 
between aliens who voluntarily departed the country and those who 
were involuntarily removed.
281
  Furthermore, the Second, Sixth, and 
Seventh Circuits would now have clear guidance as to whether the 
BIA retains jurisdiction to consider motions filed by aliens who have 
departed.
282
  Finally, the Third and Fourth Circuits could continue to 
uphold the statute itself as the final word on whether a court has ju-
 
 280 See generally Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 2010); Toora v. Holder, 603 
F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2010); Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 502 (2010); Sankar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 284 F. App’x 798 (11th Cir. 
2008); Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438 (1st Cir. 2007).   
 281 See generally Coyt, 593 F.3d 902. 
 282 See generally Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2011); Pruidze v. Holder, 632 
F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2011); Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2010). 
BONILLA_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2012  6:17 PM 
314 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:275 
 
risdiction to consider a motion to reopen filed by a departed alien.
283
  
Ultimately, this amendment or one that is similarly drafted would re-
solve each of the current inter-circuit conflicts while also conforming 
to congressional intent not to impose a geographic limitation. 
Such an amendment would provide uniformity in this immigra-
tion context that has been nonexistent for many years.  “Given that 
judicial efficiency and finality are important values,”
284
 the INA’s sta-
tutory language should be amended to provide greater uniformity in 
this immigration context by explicitly stating that an alien may file a 
motion to reopen regardless of whether the alien resides inside or 
outside of the United States.  The longer departure bar jurispru-
dence remains inconsistent, the longer certain parties may fall victim 
to the concerns described in this Comment.  Without a Supreme 
Court ruling on this matter or a modification of the current law, the 
problems detailed above will persist and aliens in certain jurisdictions 
will continue to be removed without the possibility of having their 
cases reheard. 
VIII.     CONCLUSION 
As departure bar jurisprudence currently stands, aliens subject 
to removal proceedings in different areas of the country will face dif-
ferent outcomes, not based upon the merits of their cases, but solely 
because of their geographic locations.  Such lack of uniformity 
presents problems in our legal system.  This Comment has outlined a 
few of these problems.  One problem involves governmental agen-
cies, as well as private parties, engaging in forum shopping.
285
  Anoth-
er problem, which common sense dictates, is that such a non-uniform 
practice leads to lack of predictability in the law.  This is probably 
most troublesome in circuits that have yet to directly address the de-
parture bar’s validity, as well as circuits where only unpublished, 
nonprecedential decisions have been issued.
286
  An attorney advising 
his or her client in these jurisdictions has greater difficulty predicting 
what the outcome may be or how the court will interpret the laws that 
 
 283 See generally Espinal v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2011); William v. 
Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 284 Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 197 (1996).   
 285 See supra Part I (discussing how DHS officials subjected Mendiola to removal 
proceedings in a different circuit’s jurisdiction); see also SKINNER, supra note 27, at 1. 
 286 For a discussion of cases from circuits that have issued only nonprecedential  
opinions regarding the departure bar, see supra Part V.C. 
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are already in place.  Our judicial system should strive to maintain a 
framework devoid of such concerns. 
An amendment to the INA’s statutory language explicitly stating 
that physical presence is not required for departed aliens to file mo-
tions to reopen their proceedings would provide the clarity that cir-
cuit courts need in order to reach similar outcomes on identical is-
sues.  As such, an amendment to the INA’s statutory language that 
explicitly grants immigration courts the jurisdiction to consider an 
alien’s motion to reopen, regardless of whether the alien is within or 
without the country, would both provide uniformity among the dif-
ferent circuit courts of appeals and remain true to the IIRIRA’s statu-
tory purpose of expediting removal proceedings “while eliminating 
prior statutory barriers to pursuing relief from abroad.”
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